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aBStract
This essay explores the contradictions unleashed by the heavy reliance of Gulf 
Arab countries on South Asian expatriate labor. While worker remittances 
significantly boost the living standards of home country households, the 
presence of surplus labor both stimulates the emergence of a labor permits 
market that facilitates the annual extraction of billions of dollars and allows a 
modern form of indentured servitude. Despite this reality, unfavorable economic 
conditions cause South Asian workers to seek employment in the Gulf. 
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reSumen
Este trabajo explora las contradicciones desatadas por la dependencia de los 
países del Golfo Pérsico de la mano de obra de Asia Meridional. Mientras que 
las remesas de los trabajadores suponen un estímulo significativo para el nivel 
de vida de las familias en los países de origen, el exceso de mano de obra 
estimula la emergencia de un mercado de permisos de trabajo que facilita 
la extracción anual de miles de millones de dólares, al tiempo que permite 
una forma moderna de servidumbre contratada. A pesar de esta realidad, las 
desfavorables condiciones económicas hacen que los trabajadores de Asia 
Meridional busquen trabajo en el Golfo. 
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1 . introduction1
No region in the world economy has experienced more profound economic 
and social changes over the past half-century than the Arabian Peninsula. Once 
an economic backwater, the Arabian Peninsula now boasts high living standards, 
rapidly rising literacy rates, and a modern infrastructure of roads, airports, and 
mobile phone and internet networks. This paper focuses on one unique feature 
of this rapid social and economic transformation: the unusually heavy reliance 
on expatriate labor from South Asia. While concentrating on issues affecting 
the whole region, this essay also presents more specific information on two 
of the regions most heavily implicated in this labor exchange: the emirates of 
Sharjah and Dubai in the United Arab Emirates and the state of Kerala in South 
India. 
The paper uses descriptive statistics and a variety of ethnographic and 
journalistic sources to document the contradictions that have been unleashed 
by this massive movement of labor. Despite serious conflicts of interest, large 
numbers of households of the Gulf and South Asia now depend economically 
on the employment of South Asian labor in the Arabian Peninsula. Because of 
these deep economic interests, it is not likely that this unique pattern of labor 
utilization will be disrupted even though tensions between expatriate workers 
and national citizens of the Gulf remain high. 
1 The Office of the Provost of American University provided important funding for this research. The 
author would like to thank the faculty and staff of the Centre of Development Studies in Trivandrum, 
Kerala for their hospitality. Dr. S. Irudaya Rajan of the Centre was of great assistance and generously 
shared the results of his investigations. Thanks also to Rich Burchett, Mary Ann Fay, Garay Menicucci, 
Mustapha Pasha, B.A. Prakash, David Spielman, and members of American University’s Globalization 
and South Asian seminars for insightful and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Bob 
Sutcliffe, Arthur MacEwan, and two anonymous reviewers provided very helpful comments as well.
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2 . empirical overview
One significant feature of the economic and social developments of the 
past fifty years is the rapid population growth in the Arabian Peninsula due to 
high birth rates and significant in-migration. 
taBle 1: population growth of the araBian peninSula, 1950-97 . (thouSandS)
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1997
Bahrain 116 156 220 347 503 620
Kuwait 152 278 744 1,357 2,143 2,153
Oman 413 505 654 988 1,524 2,256
Qatar 25 45 111 229 490 522
SaudiArabia 3,201 4,075 5,745 9,3W72 15,800 19,500
UAE 70 90 223 1,015 1,589 2,696
GCCTotal 3,977 5,149 7,697 13,326 22,049 27,747
Source: Kapiszewski, 2000.
taBle 2: increaSeS in the utilization of expatriate laBor in the gulf
Number in thousands
(Date in parentheses)
Number in thousands
Percent of total 
workforce (1995-97)
Bahrain 81 (1981) 181 (2001) 62
Kuwait 546 (1980) 981 (2000) 84
Oman 432 (1993) 530 (2001) 65
Qatar 179 (1986) 300 (2000) 82
Saudi Arabia 391 (1974) 3,000 (2000) 64
UAE 505 (1980) 1,300 (2000) 90
Total 75
Source: Gloria Mareno Fontes Chammartin, “Women Migrant Workers’ Protection in Arab League 
States”, in Gender and Migration in Arab States: The Case of Domestic Workers, ed. By Simel Esim 
and Monica Smith (Beirut: ILO, Regional Office for Arab States, June 2004): 12.
While Tables 1 and 2 document the Arabian Peninsula’s heavy reliance on 
expatriate labor, the data also highlight important differences among the GCC 
states.2 While the internal population growth has been high in all countries, 
per capita GDP seems to regulate the degree to which expatriate labor is 
2 GCC stands for Gulf Cooperation Council. The members of the GCC are: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Yemen has applied for membership, but the 
monarchies of the region are suspicious and perhaps threatened by its republican structure. As we 
shall see in the conclusion, important issues related to labor migration also hinder Yemen’s entrance 
into the GCC.
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used (Table 3). Thus, those nations with lower per-capita GDP rely more on 
their national workforce, while the more wealthy nations of Kuwait, Qatar, and 
the United Arab Emirates manifest both greater expatriate presence in their 
society as well as higher internal population growth. Despite Saudi Arabia’s 
weaker reliance on foreign labor, approximately fifty percent of expatriate 
workers within the GCC are employed there. 
taBle 3: per capita gdp and the preSence of expatriateS in the national population
GCC Countries 
Ranked by Per 
Capita GDP
Per Capita GDP (PPP 
1999)
Percentage 
of Expatriates in 
Total Population
Percentage Growth of 
National Population 
(1950-1997)
Qatar $18,789 67 528
UAE $18,162 76 840
Kuwait $17,289 66 389
Bahrain $13,688 39 231
Oman $13.356 28 298
Saudi Arabia $10,815 31 322
GCC 39 330
Sources: Kapiszewski, 2000, and United Nations Development Program, 2001.
Based on these broad data, it is reasonable to posit two demand factors that 
stimulate labor migration to the Gulf. First, the creation of an infrastructure for 
exploiting the petroleum riches required both highly trained professionals and 
manual laborers. Neither the skill levels nor size of the indigenous population 
were adequate for this export-led growth. Second, as per-capita GDP rose, 
the demand for durable consumer goods, leisure services, educational and 
health services, and information technology generated a powerful employment 
multiplier effect that pulled foreign workers into a broad array of occupations.3 
In addition to these demand factors, increasing national incomes in combination 
with state redistribution policies that are not linked to work effort have 
provided strong supply-side incentives for national households and businesses 
to substitute leisure for labor through the hiring of expatriate workers.  
3 . national vS . expatriate workerS: the uae experience
To delve further into this dependence on expatriate labor, the economy 
of the United Arab Emirates provides an instructive case in point. Its reliance 
on foreign workers highlights in the extreme the differences between national 
and non-national workers characteristic of all the Arabian Peninsula. Most UAE 
3 El Musa has argued that the oil economy provided no backward or forward linkages to Gulf 
economies. The absence of backward linkages—that is, the development of industries to supply the 
technologically sophisticated oil industry—is a plausible claim. On the other hand, the huge rise in 
living standards has spawned enormous forward linkages indicated by the development of service 
industries that require significant technological capability [Sherif S. El Musa, “Technology and the 
Dynamics of Socio-Economic Change,” The Middle East Journal 51 (Summer 1997): 358-72].
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nationals work for the UAE government.4 It is reported that a notable portion 
of national workers fails to perform their tasks with much alacrity or efficiency.5 
Absenteeism in the government sector is a constant problem. Yet, the average 
government salary reported in 1996 was AED 107,600–approximately U.S. 
$30,000 per year. Moreover, it is likely that UAE nationals received an average 
amount significantly higher than that, since non-nationals within the government 
tend to cluster in the lower salary echelons. With the exception of the crude 
oil sector—which employs only 2 percent of the workforce—and the finance 
and insurance sectors, no other employment sector offers compensation that 
equates to half the amount of the government sector (Table 4). 
Most governments are now encouraging private banks and other financial 
enterprises to employ more national citizens in this high-wage sector. Even if 
nationals completely supplanted expatriate labor in the financial sector and 
saturated this industry, it would be unlikely that UAE nationals would then 
move into the low-wage retail trade or manufacturing sectors.6
taBle 4: average annual compenSation By economic Sector in uae, 1997 (thouSandS of dollarS)
Economic Sector
Percent of 
Workforce
Annual 
Compensation
Percent of Government 
Services Compensation
Crude Oil 1.6 24.2 82
Agriculture 7.6 3.8 13
Mining and Quarrying 0.3 7.2 24
Manufacturing 11.8 6.7 23
Electricity, Gas, and Water 1.8 13.2 45
Construction 19.1 10.4 35
Wholesale and Retail Trade 17.3 7.3 25
Restaurants and Hotels 3.8 6.0 20
Transportation, Storage, and 
Communication
7.3 10.2 35
Finance and Insurance 1.5 26.5 90
Real Estate 2.5 7.6 26
Government Services 10.9 29.5 100
Social and Personal Services 4.6 7.9 27
Domestic Services* 10.0 2.8 10
Weighted Average 10.4 35
Source: International Monetary Fund, 1998.
*Does not include room and board expenses borne by employer.
4 There is also a significant presence in the oil industry, the financial sector, and the state-owned 
telecommunications sector.
5 While commenting on the problem of the unemployment of national citizens, Kapiszewski (2000, 
10-11) states that, “Another reason for unemployment is nationals’ work ethic. Nationals are often 
disinclined to enter low-skilled posts while, at the same time, the educational systems are not well 
equipped to deal with the problem of how to reorientate traditional work values. In the majority of 
cases, nationals are ready to enter only occupations that are culturally acceptable, high in social 
status, typical ‘modern’ and connected with the white-collar environment.” 
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The UAE’s highly unequal compensation structure suggests a profound 
bifurcation between the national population and the non-national population. 
It is not that nationals do not work in “blue-collar” occupations; male 
citizens do work for the government as security guards or in public safety. 
Rather, the evidence suggests that this work is protected and rewarded with 
disproportionately high compensation. Moreover, the bifurcated wage structure 
even understates the difference in the two labor forces, since nationals receive 
subsidized supplies of energy, free medical care, free higher education, and 
free land. In addition, many families receive substantial cash transfers through 
programs such as the “marriage fund” during key stages of their lives.7
This snapshot of labor segmentation ignores the very real divisions within 
the expatriate workforce. For example, there is a caste of highly-paid European 
and North American professionals who have also settled in the region. 
Moreover, South Asian and Arab professionals have also settled in the Gulf on 
an almost permanent basis. The multicultural look of a city like Dubai obscures 
the highly segmented lives that such workers live. It is not unusual for adults in 
their social lives to only associate with those of the same nationality, religion 
or ethnicity.8
  
4 . the impact of the out-migration of keralite workerS on the economy of 
kerala9
Historical accounts suggest that starting with the oil price boom of the 
early 1970s, Gulf countries began to turn away from employing low-wage Arab 
labor from Yemen and Egypt and toward the even cheaper labor reserves in 
Pakistan.10 Toward the end of the 1970s, in-migration from India increased as 
the relative presence of Pakistani workers diminished.11 The Gulf War of 1991 
intensified this trend, especially with the expulsion of large numbers of Arab 
workers from Egypt and Palestine.
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6 By comparison, the poorer male citizens of Oman, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia do work in relatively 
low-paid jobs. In these countries, the percentage of expatriate workers is significantly lower.
7 The only exception to the pattern of the national workforce receiving high pay for labor services is 
in the agricultural sector, where Emiratis tend land in the oil-poor emirates of Ras Al Khaimah and 
Fujairah. Most of the nationals in the police force and military come from these emirates as well.
8 Most Asian professionals hail from South Asia. There is also a significant presence of Filipino 
and South Korean professionals, who enjoy higher prestige. This hierarchy is malleable and differs 
according to one’s perspective. For an excellent discussion of issues of class, ethnicity, and status in 
Kuwait, see Anh Nga Longva, Walls Built on Sand: Migration and Exclusion in Kuwait (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1997).
9 It is difficult to be more precise about the national composition of the expatriate workforce. The 
governments of the region are sensitive about their dependence on expatriate labor and do not 
publish the labor force data that are undoubtedly available to them.
10 Sharon Stanton Russell and Muhammad Ali Al-Ramadhan, “Kuwait’s Migration Policy Since the Gulf 
Crisis,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 26 (November 1994): 569-87.
11 For data on Pakistan, see Jonathan S. Addleton, Undermining the Centre: The Gulf Migration and 
Pakistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
38
B.A. Prakash, who has studied Indian migration to Gulf countries during the 
past two decades, notes that emigration of Indians to the Gulf divides in four 
stages:
1. 1976-1979: Beginning of out-migration.
2. 1980-1983: Rapid growth.
3. 1984-1990: Declining growth.
4. 1991-1994: Revival and intensified growth.12
Data from the Indian Ministry of Labor support Prakash’s migration typology. 
Moreover, the steadily rising stock of Indian workers in the Gulf imply that out-
migration from the region slows when in-migration falters. This synchronicity 
of labor import and export has resulted in a steady rise in the pool of Indian 
migrants to the Gulf during the last two decades (Tables 5 and 6).
taBle 5: annual laBor outflow from india
Year Number in Thousands
1977-79 263.7
1980-82 751.7
1983-85 401.9
1986-88 409
1989-91 460
1992-94 1,325.5
Source: Prakash, 1998.
taBle 6: indian migrantS in the araBian peninSula and gulf
Year Number in Thousands
1979 501
1981 599
1983 916
1987 957
1990 1,235
1991 1,650
1996 2,800
Source: Prakash, 1998.
These and other figures imply that Indian workers comprise slightly less 
than 40 percent of the total expatriate population, while fifty percent of Indian 
migrants come from Kerala. Since the mid-1990s, evidence suggests that at 
least until the year 2000, the in-migration of South Asian workers continued 
at an intense pace. For example, Zachariah, Mathew, and Rajan report that 
between the late 1980s and late 1990s, the annual rate of migration from the 
John willoughBy
12 B.A. Prakash, “Gulf Migration and Its Economic Impact: The Kerala Experience,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 12 (December 1998): 3210.
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state of Kerala increased by 120 percent.13 It is important to realize that even 
though Kerala is one of the smallest states in India, Kerala’s population is larger 
than all the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia combined. Moreover, this aggregate 
Arabian population includes the resident Keralite expatriate population (which 
is probably between 5 to 10 percent of the total.)14
5 . the economic impact of out-migration on kerala 
The effects of out-migration on Kerala are less well known than the impact 
on the host Gulf countries. If macroeconomic and labor market conditions 
approximate W. Arthur Lewis’s model of unlimited labor services being supplied 
at subsistence wages, then any outflow of workers would benefit the home 
country.15 Even if wages did not rise from the outflow, the inflow of remittance 
payments would boost living standards of Kerala. If, on the other hand, the 
quite finite professional labor permanently leaves the home country, then such 
a “brain drain” could cripple its productive capacity. 
Unlike those of most of the Indian sub-continent, the social indicators 
of Kerala show that female and male literacy rates are over 90 percent; life 
expectancy is over 70; and birth rates have recently fallen below replacement 
levels. In other words, while economic indicators would place Kerala in the 
Third World, social indicators suggest a more developed society than the Gulf 
States.16 As such, Kerala does not epitomize Lewis’s model of a land peopled 
by desperate, impoverished, and unproductive workers. Nevertheless, the 
economic circumstances of the migrants suggest that unemployment along 
with the demand for temporary workers to fill “unskilled” jobs describes Keralite 
workers employed in the Gulf. 
To provide a picture of the workers from Kerala in the Arabian Peninsula, 
the Center for Development Studies in Trivandrum and the Indo-Dutch Program 
on Alternatives in Development sponsored a survey of 10,000 households 
to assess the reasons for and consequences of migration. Tables 7 and 8 
summarize data on the destination and origins of Keralite workers.
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13 K.C. Zachariah et al., “Impact of Migration on Kerala’s Economy and Society,” International 
Migration 39 (2001): 66. 
14 If we accept Kapiszewski’s report that 39 percent of the total population in the GCC countries is 
expatriate and that 40 percent of the foreign presence is Indian, this means that between 15 and 
16 percent of all residents in the GCC countries are Indian. It is commonly estimated that half of all 
Indians in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia hail from Kerala. Thus, approximately 7.5 percent of the total 
population is Keralite. The figure for the UAE would be approximately 15 percent.
15 The classic statement of the Lewis perspective is in W. Arthur Lewis, “Economic Development with 
Unlimited Supplies of Labour,” The Manchester School 232 (1954): 139-91.
16 Data and analysis that highlight the unique nature of Kerala’s development path can be found in 
Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1995).
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taBle 7: emigration deStination of keralite workerS, 1998
Destination Number (thousands) Percentage
Saudi Arabia 519 38.1
UAE (total) 405 29.7
Abu Dhabi, UAE* 133 9.7
Dubai and Sharjah, UAE* 272 20.0
Oman 142 10.4
Bahrain 77 5.7
Kuwait 69 5.1
Qatar 64 4.7
USA 30 2.2
Other 57 4.2
Source: K.C. Zachariah, E.T. Matthew and S. Irudaya Rajan, Dynamics of Migration in Kerala: 
Dimensions, Differentials and Consequences (Thirunananthapuram: Centre for Development Studies, 
Indo-Dutch Program on Alternatives in Development, October 2000).
*Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah are the three largest emirates of the UAE. The UAE figures do not 
include emigration to the other emirates of the UAE and thus are a slight underestimate.
taBle 8: occupational diStriBution of emigrantS (By percentage)
Occupation Before Migration After Migration
State/Government Employee 2.2 2.5
Semi-government Employee 0.6 0.9
Private Sector Employee 15.4 40.8
Self-Employed 13.9 4.4
Unpaid Worker 0.8 0.0
Agricultural Laborer 1.8 0.1
Non-Agricultural Laborer 34.1 47.5
Job Seeker 26.5 0.7
Voluntarily Unemployed 0.2 0.2
Student 1.5 0.4
Household Work 3.2 2.6
Source: K.C. Zachariah, E.T. Matthew and S. Irudaya Rajan, Dynamics of Migration in Kerala: 
Dimensions, Differentials and Consequences (Thirunananthapuram: Centre for Development Studies, 
Indo-Dutch Program on Alternatives in Development, October 2000): 95.
The migrating workers are overwhelmingly (90 percent) young males 
in their mid-20s. They tend to work as laborers or in other low-wage jobs; 
26.5 percent are listed as job seekers in Kerala, and 47.5 percent work as 
non-agricultural laborers in the Gulf. Approximately half of them are married. 
While 27 percent of the households in Kerala practice Islam, 51 percent of 
the emigrants are Muslims. Although functionally literate, two-thirds of the 
migrants have no higher or technical training.17 These workers come from the 
state’s poorer districts.
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Zachariah, Mathew, and Rajan have constructed a measure of the intensity 
of migration by district. The Migration Prevalence Ratio (MPR) measures the 
number of people who have migrated and/or returned per 100 households.18 
In addition, the Household Migration Rate (HMR) measures the number of 
households per 100 that have members who are presently working outside 
Kerala or who have returned.
taBle 9: the intenSity of keralite migration
District of Kerala Migration Prevalence Ratio Household Migration Rate
Pathanmthitta 98.6 59.4
Thrissur 88.5 49.8
Malappuram 78.1 52.2
Alappuzha 72.7 38.9
Palakhat 65.1 37.1
Thirunananthapuram 61.6 44.9
Kasargode 60.7 38.1
Kollam 59.4 41.7
Koshikode 48.4 37.7
Kannai 42.4 35.4
Ernakulam 37.3 25.4
Kottayam 35.9 27.5
Wayanad 19.6 16.0
Idukki 11.5 7.6
Total for Kerala 59.0 38.5
Source: K.C. Zachariah, E.T. Matthew and S. Irudaya Rajan, Dynamics of Migration in Kerala: 
Dimensions, Differentials and Consequences (Thirunananthapuram: Centre for Development Studies, 
Indo-Dutch Program on Alternatives in Development, October 2000).
These data show that while migration to the Gulf may have minimal impact 
on the huge Indian economy, it profoundly affects the society and economy of 
Kerala. Thirty-nine percent of all households have at least one member who is 
working or has worked outside of the state.19 The number of people who have 
worked outside Kerala is more than half of the total number of households in 
the state. For this reason, remittances have sharply raised per capita income 
above per capita gross domestic product. In the early 1980s, for example, the 
district of Malappuram reported a per capita income figure 69 percent higher 
amBivalent anxietieS of the South aSian-gulf araB laBor exchange
reviSta de economía mundial 14, 2006, 31-56
17 Ibíd, 75-81.
18 This includes migrants to other parts of India as well as international emigration. In recent decades, 
emigration has outweighed internal migration by Keralites.
19 K.C. Zachariah et al., Dynamics of Migration in Kerala: Dimensions, Differentials and Consequences. 
(Thirunananthapuram: Centre for Development Studies, Indo-Dutch Program on Alternatives in 
Development,  October 2000): 89. I.S. Gulati and Ashoka Mody, “Remittances of Indian Migrants 
to the Middle East: An Assessment with Special Reference to Migrants from Kerala State,” Working 
Paper 182 (Trivandrum: Centre for Development Studies, November 1983).
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than the per capita gross domestic product.20 As a reesult, Kerala’s per capita 
consumption levels are amongst the highest in India, even though Kerala is a 
relatively poor state within a very poor country.21 Data collected from survey 
data show more precisely how out-migration has changed the living standards 
of Keralite workers. Table 10 lists key consumer durables and calculates the 
percentage of households that have such items. It is clear that those households 
that have sent working members out of Kerala fare significantly better than 
non-migrant households.22
taBle 10: percent of houSeholdS poSSeSSing Selected houSehold conSumer duraBleS By 
migration StatuS, 1998
Consumer Durables
Return Emigrant 
Households
Emigrant Households
Non-Migrant 
Households
Motor Car 7 6 2
Motor Cycle 18 12 8
Telephone 31 32 11
Television 54 53 34
VCR 28 28 6
Radio 28 28 6
Water Pump 46 52 22
Sewing Machine 24 21 14
Refrigerator 41 40 13
Washing Machine 20 16 4
Fan 80 83 47
Mixer 60 66 28
Gas Stove 39 38 15
Clock 88 91 76
Iron 72 76 37
Stereo 52 51 21
Watch 95 91 79
Cycle 33 27 25
Sofa 34 34 15
Toaster 5 3 1
Source: K.C. Zachariah, E.T. Matthew and S. Irudaya Rajan, 
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20 Ibíd.
21 Joseph Tharamangalam, “The Perils of Social Development with Economic Growth: The Development 
Debacle of Kerala, India,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (January-March 1998).
22 While the data on consumer durables demonstrate considerable gains in material benefits for 
Keralite households, some have argued that the mental health costs of prolonged separation are 
high. This would seem to be a plausible assertion, if it were not for the fact that ethnographic and 
survey data are ambiguous. Leela Gulati, for example, argues that some of the women left behind 
gain considerable autonomy and actually experience an improvement in their marital relations. Leela 
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6 . limiting SurpluS laBor: tranSactionS coStS, rent extraction and the 
ScramBle for JoBS in the gulf
The reality of low wages and high unemployment in regions like Kerala 
means that Gulf employers acquire labor within a buyer’s market. Even though 
the income offered to many laborers is low, high unemployment and even lower 
wages in South Asia push large numbers of excess workers to “bid” for jobs. 
That surplus labor scrambles for scarce jobs is an all-too familiar aspect of the 
global migration experience. 
Given that institutional barriers, wage-setting customs, or efficiency wage 
calculations prevent the offering of lower wages that might limit the inflow of 
workers, then other administrative and market-based institutions facilitate this 
rationing of labor.23
Both the UAE and Indian governments have attempted to implement 
administrative regulations to halt the movement of excess labor. For a worker 
to receive a visa for employment in the UAE, the UAE government must issue a 
work permit or a “no objection certificate.” In addition, the Indian government 
also requires evidence of employment before issuing an exit permit.
These administrative rules could in principal reduce the number of migrants 
to the desired amount without the emergence of markets to ration access to the 
Gulf labor market. In fact, however, such measures do not effectively permit the 
state to regulate the inflow of labor through bureaucratic command. Instead, a 
market in permits and “sponsorships” has emerged. Workers compete against 
each other for the papers necessary to obtain a visa, and this allows the seller 
of such certificates to extract rents through discriminatory pricing for agent 
services and “cheating”—the payment for services that are not delivered. 
These transactions costs can also be considered a rental payment. Workers 
are willing to accept a lower wage that that being offered in the Gulf, and thus 
part with purchasing power in order to gain access to jobs that pay above their 
reservation wage. (See the appendix for an elementary illustration of this rent 
extraction process.) The employee surplus that workers would have attained 
instead is transferred to a transnational network of labor recruitment agents 
and Gulf sponsors of the worker.
It may appear counter-intuitive to suggest that South Asian workers would 
be willing to work for even lower wages than they receive in the Gulf, but 
the extraordinary risk-taking and willingness to contract large debt of many 
migrants suggest that the incomes promised in the Gulf are seductive for 
poor households in India and elsewhere. For example, one Keralite informant 
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Gulati, In the Absence of Their Men: The Impact of Male Migration on Women (New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 1993)
23 It is not certain that market-clearing wages can be established in an environment of unrestricted 
migration since development theorists have long noted that the presence of surplus workers in urban 
areas is a common feature of Third World economies. See Michael P. Todaro, Internal Migration in 
Developing Countries (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1976).
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of ethnographer Leela Gulati describes the initial travails of her husband, 
Basheer.
“Things did not move fast for Basheer. It took almost two years after our 
marriage to locate an agent who promised to obtain an employment permit 
for Basheer. According to him, we would require Rs. 15,000 (U.S. $319) to 
cover the cost of the employment permit as well as the return air ticket.
To put together the money, several sources had to be tapped. But my 
jewelry came first. There was also the cash that my parents had given in 
my dowry. My mother-in-law and sister-in-law also gave up their gold.
Once the money was ready Basheer became impatient and started 
pestering the agent. That, it turned out, was a big mistake. He was sent to 
Bombay on the promise that he would be given the employment voucher 
and ticket. But this turned out to be false. After waiting for nearly four 
months in Bombay where one lives on one’s own, usually in a mosque and 
in extremely difficult conditions, he returned home empty-handed. He was 
angry with himself and the agent. We thought he would never make it”.24
Baheer’s story illustrates the most common method of recruiting labor 
or selling jobs. The sponsors who begin to search for expatriate workers may 
represent large corporations, owners of small businesses, or even individual Gulf 
national householders. In all cases, these “sponsors” of expatriate workers must 
obtain the necessary certificates from the UAE government. Large businesses 
or institutions normally do not inflate the number of positions required. They 
seem content with the potential profits by employing the workers. On the other 
hand, it is not unusual for heads of households or owners of small businesses 
to overstate their labor requirements and then sell the excess permits to eager 
individuals attempting to “crack” the UAE labor market. 
flow chart 1: gaining entry to the gulf laBor market
SPONSORS OBTAIN VISAS OR  
NO OBJECTION CERTIFICATES
 
AGENTS BUY DOCUMENTS
AGENTS RECRUIT WORKERS, 
WHO BUY DOCUMENTS
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The sponsors with excess permits often market them. The buyers could be 
licensed labor recruitment agencies, unlicensed agencies, or private individuals 
such as workers returning to Kerala on leave or because their contract and 
residence visa have expired. Often these permits are resold to other agents 
before finding a would-be emigrant. Once a worker arrives in the UAE, his 
travails may not have ended. Despite guarantees, it often happens that 
employment is not available for the worker. A search for further employment 
by the worker requires the expenditure of more funds to new sponsors and 
agents so that the worker’s employment status can be regularized. 
Another method of obtaining employment is to enter the UAE as a tourist 
and then search for a job and purchase work permits there (Flow Chart II). As 
Nair states, this method also leaves the worker vulnerable to exploitation. 
“Though this method of job search is hazardous and land many of the 
aspirants in jail, thousands do manage to get jobs and regularize their 
travel and employment documents with the help of their employers. It is 
understood that some of the employers in the host countries find it more 
economical to make such on the spot recruitment because in these cases 
they don’t have to incur the cost of making recruitments either directly or 
through recruiting agents. Further they could also get recruits on terms and 
conditions much inferior to those they would otherwise have to agree to”.25
flow chart 2: alternative method of gaining entry to the gulf laBor market
WORKERS ENTER
GULF ON TOURIST VISA
WORKERS FIND SPONSORS THROUGH 
NETWORKS OF KIN AND AGENTS
WORKERS PAY SPONSORS  
FOR WORK DOCUMENTS
Zachariah, Mathew, and Rajan find through their survey data that workers 
spent on average Rs. 77,268 or U.S. $1,644 to obtain a job. If we subtract 
the ticket expense, which the worker would have to absorb whether or not he 
or she had to buy the necessary certificates for Gulf employment, the total 
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rent extracted from the average Keralite worker is $1365 or Rs. 64,155. This 
payment can be viewed as rent in the sense that workers are reducing their real 
wage below what is being offered and transferring this difference to those who 
facilitate entry into the labor market. Note that each emigrant on average loses 
Rs. 20,654 or U.S. $439 through “cheating” (the selling of false documents 
and misrepresenting employment prospects). This absorbs 32 percent of total 
rent payments made by impoverished Keralite workers and 27 percent of total 
job-seeking costs.  
taBle 12: per-capita coStS of emigration
Type of Cost U.S. Dollar Expense Percentage Share
Ticket $279 16.9
Visa $627 38.1
Agent Commission $299 18.2
Cheating $439 26.7
Total $1,644
Source: KC Zachriah, ET Mathew and S. Irudaya Rajan, 1999.
Note: Rs. 47 = U.S. $1.00 at the time of this survey.
 .
The total amount of rent extracted from Indian migrant workers can only 
be roughly estimated. However, if we follow the data from Table 7, which 
tell us that 1.276 million Indian workers entered the Gulf in 1998, then the 
total amount of rent extracted that year from these workers would have been 
$1,741,740,000. This $1.7 billion dollar figure is clearly an underestimate 
of the total rent extracted from migrant workers, since Indian workers roughly 
represent forty percent of total immigrant labor. The total amount of rent taken 
was in 1998 more likely $4 billion. Note that this figure does not include the 
regular payments that workers already in the Gulf must make to sponsors to 
maintain their employment status. Facilitating the entry and maintenance of 
Asian workers to the Gulf is more than a billion dollar industry.
Those who extract the rent from job-seeking workers are Gulf nationals, 
expatriate business people in the Gulf, and licensed and unlicensed recruitment 
agents in Kerala. This largely private network of rent-seeking agents involves 
both Indians and Emiratis and is only imperfectly controlled by the UAE, Indian, 
and Keralite governments. Indian government officials weakly attempt to limit 
the exploitation of job-seeking agents by Indian nationals, and UAE officials 
have difficulty controlling the number of available visas because Emirati citizens 
gain considerable revenue from sponsoring expatriate workers. Nationals may 
either use their influence to obtain visas that can be sold to formal and informal 
recruiting agents in Kerala (or to Keralite workers who sell visas on their return 
home) or they can receive funds from agents or workers who have access to 
visas but need a sponsor to formalize their employment in the UAE. 
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Within the wider framework of nationalizing the UAE workforce, often 
referred to as “Emiratization,” the drive by UAE entrepreneurs to sponsor 
expatriate workers clearly frustrates efforts for such nationalistic aspirations 
for the workforce. National business people attempt to subvert government 
policy for their own gain, while at the same time complaining about the high 
wages they would have to pay to their own citizens. As Addleton suggests, 
large-scale migration undermines the regulatory capacity of the state to direct 
economic life and shows the strength of globalization processes in thwarting 
the goals of home and host governments.26 
7 . indentured Servitude in the 21St century
The immigration control process is flexible and open to manipulation partly 
because enforcement costs are significant and partly because certain citizens 
within each state clearly profit from this ambiguity. I would hypothesize, 
however, that an additional reason for the toleration of a surplus labor pool in 
the UAE is that it also furnishes a reserve that facilitates the control of labor. 
Because the labor market is slack, workers have diminished bargaining power. 
Moreover, the presence of a surplus labor pool leads individual employers and 
the UAE government to impose extra regulations that facilitate the tracking of 
immigrant workers who have no legal right to reside in the UAE without a job. 
These extra controls tie workers more tightly to particular jobs and create a 
modern form of indentured servitude. The effort to tie workers to a particular 
job in the Gulf is both a technique designed to extract greater worker effort 
and a national security response to the destabilizing threat of large numbers of 
unemployed non-citizen workers within a sparsely populated country.27 
To illustrate the nature of this system of labor control, one can refer to the 
Gulf News of Dubai, which publishes a weekly column entitled “Ask the Law”. 
Many of the letters revolve around the legal complexities that inevitably arise 
when non-citizens marry, divorce, have sex, or get into traffic accidents.28 A 
large number of letters, however, lament the peculiarities of the UAE labor 
market. For example on March 8, 2002, A. Haroon of Dubai writes: 
“The company that has sponsored me gave my passport to another 
company as guarantee without my knowledge. I now need my passport. 
My sponsor is out of the country and my passport has been with the other 
company for four months. The company that has my passport needs a 
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27 For the human and worker rights implications of this system of labor control, see Virginia Sherry, 
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bank guarantee from my sponsor company. This is not possible in the 
absence of my sponsor and without his signature. 
Can a company who is sponsoring an employee give an employee’s 
passport to someone else without the employee’s knowledge? If so, how 
can the employee get his passport? Can the employee take legal action?”
It is impossible to know exactly the reasons behind the complex exchange 
that Haroon describes. Most likely, the original sponsoring company agreed 
to transfer Haroon to another company and simultaneously transferred the 
passport. Now, however, he cannot transfer to another company or leave 
the region without his original sponsor paying the other company some 
compensation for the loss of his services. Until that payment is made, Haroon 
must work in his new company. Whatever the precise circumstances, the Gulf 
News columnist writes:
“A company which keeps its worker’s passport may not use the passport for 
any purpose without permission from the passport’s holder. A passport is kept 
as a security measure and may not be submitted as guarantee to a third party 
because there is no relationship between the worker and that party.
The worker can submit a complaint to the police or the prosecution 
demanding that his passport be returned to him because there is no relationship 
between him and the company which holds the passport as a guarantee”.29
Haroon thus has legal recourse, but it is certainly possible that he does not 
wish to complain to the police or endure the psychological and financial strain 
of litigation. Further investigation could reveal that Haroon is working in a job 
that does not correspond to his visa. A complaint to the police might deprive 
him of his sponsor’s protection and leave him vulnerable to deportation. 
It is not unusual for employees in any labor market to lack leverage over 
their employers and thus be reluctant to complain or protest heavy-handed 
practices. In the UAE and the rest of the Gulf, the sponsors’ or employers’ holding 
the workers’ passport combined with strict laws against labor organization 
weaken labor’s bargaining power further. While formally illegal, it is clear that a 
trade in passports has emerged in the Gulf, which allows employers to sell their 
employees’ labor services to another company. This arbitrary tying of a worker 
to an employer not of her choosing leaves him or her with little recourse. For 
many, the only realistic fall-back position is a return to an impoverished home 
country with even poorer job prospects. 
The lack of expatriate worker power is one reason why non-payment 
of wages is one of the most common complaints of workers in the Gulf. For 
example, E. Lising of Dubai writes in the February 15 issue of the Gulf News:
“I have a friend working in a company in Jebel Ali. In April, the company 
sent him and several others a letter saying that they would have to take 
four months’ leave since the company did not have enough projects to 
support their employees. Only one month was paid for. Six months have 
gone by and the company has not recalled them. Is this legal?”
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Once again, the newspaper’s columnist assures the correspondent that the 
workers should be compensated: “It is the responsibility of the company to find 
jobs for its workers.”30 Nevertheless, this story and many others that nearly 
all professional and expatriate workers know about testify to the difficulties 
associated with the enforcement of these laws and the real vagaries of the 
global market.
The answers of the “Ask the Law” columnist do reveal that there are some 
limits to the arbitrary behavior of Gulf employers. If the UAE government made 
no effort to control immigration or regulate working conditions, the pressure 
of large pools of unemployed workers combined with erratic and unfair labor 
practices could threaten social stability. The government clearly recognizes the 
range of possibilities for abuse. Laws are on the books to protect workers from 
unscrupulous employers. Moreover, the government does occasionally attempt 
to enforce these laws. The sporadic nature of this intervention, however, leaves 
a contradictory body of practices that both protect and lay the institutional 
framework for the systematic exploitation of expatriate workers. Given these 
contradictory goals, it is not surprising that governmental efforts to regulate 
working conditions often appear confused and contradictory.
8 . the gender dimenSion of the gulf-aSian migration experience
The problem of worker abuse outlined in the previous section is most 
severe for female workers. Table 13 demonstrates that over thirty years there 
has been a significant increase in the relative importance of women expatriate 
workers within the Gulf Arab labor market. Some of this is due to the slow but 
steady feminization of retail and clerical work. More significant, however, has 
been a sharp rise in the use of migrant workers to perform domestic service. 
Because of the rise in household incomes, the creation of villas for nuclear as 
opposed to extended families, and the increased labor force participation of 
national women, the demand for female foreign workers has risen sharply.
taBle 13: the increaSing importance of female expatriate workerS
Percent of Expatriate Workers that 
Are Female (Date in parentheses)
Percent of Expatriate Workers 
that Are Female
Bahrain 9 (1981) 19 (2001)
Kuwait 13 (1980) 21 (2000)
Oman 10 (1993) 35 (2001)
Qatar 9 (1986) 26 (2000)
Saudi Arabia 5 (1974) 36 (2000)
UAE 5 (1980) 33 (2000)
Source: Gloria Mareno Fontes Chammartin, “Women Migrant Workers’ Protection in Arab League 
States”, in Gender and Migration in Arab States: The Case of Domestic Workers, ed. By Simel Esim 
and Monica Smith (Beirut: ILO, Regional Office for Arab States, June 2004): 12.
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The first two factors are closely connected to each other. An increase in 
income allows national women to avoid cooking, cleaning and child care labor 
that their ancestors would have done without assistance. In addition, increases 
in income combined with government policies that subsidize the purchase 
of land by national citizens have encouraged young couples to set up their 
households either away from the family compound or within a larger complex 
containing separate villas for each nuclear household. These spatial changes in 
living arrangements have made it more difficult for female kin within a family to 
share in the household labor.
As with male employees, the primary supply of female workers has come 
from Asian countries. On the other hand, the data indicate that there is a 
“division of labor” within South and Southeast Asia. The large South Asian 
countries (India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) primarily supply male workers, 
while Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Philippines provide women workers to the 
Gulf. (Male workers from Thailand also dominate outflows of female workers 
from this country.)
taBle 14: outflowS of expatriate workerS By nationality and Sex
Total Male (%) Female (%) Total Male (%) Female (%)
Bangladesh 
(1993)
3412 98 2
Bangladesh 
(2000)
222746
Indonesia 
(1983)
12018 52 48
Indonesia 
(1997)
502739 34 66
Philippines 
(1980)
38628 82 18
Philippines 
(2000)
253030 30 70
Sri Lanka 5150 67 33 Sri Lanka (2001) 183888 35 65
Thailand 
(1986)
7149 94 6
Thailand 
(1996)
185401 85 15
Source: Gloria Mareno Fontes Chammartin, “Women Migrant Workers’ Protection in Arab League 
States”, in Gender and Migration in Arab States: The Case of Domestic Workers, ed. By Simel Esim 
and Monica Smith (Beirut: ILO, Regional Office for Arab States, June 2004): 13.
While there are undoubtedly demand factors at work that might lead 
Gulf employers to view Muslim Indonesian women as attractive candidates 
for domestic work, the evidence suggests that this national difference is 
primarily due to home country policies. India and Pakistan, in particular, have 
discouraged the movement of women workers to the Gulf in response to reports 
of mistreatment of women citizens by Gulf nationals. 
This concern over mistreatment is unfortunately borne out by the 
information we have on conditions facing domestic workers. The common 
practice of taking away an employees’ passport often combines with the greater 
isolation of individual servants within households and Gulf Arab patriarchal and 
chauvinistic attitudes to create a hostile work environment. The most recent 
studies of domestic servants in the Gulf tell us that these women workers work 
very long hours and often experience abuse from their employers. 
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A survey in Kuwait, for example, reveals that domestic servants work 
between 78 and 100 hours per week. About the only free time such workers 
would have is when they are sleeping. Beyond these excessive hours, domestics 
in Kuwait can expect at most only one or two days off per month. A significant 
minority of this workforce receive no time off at all.31 Similar conditions are 
reported for servants in the United Arab Emirates. As Sabban argues:
“Domestic service is the only paid job where employees are not allowed a 
day-off. For employers, giving foreign female domestic workers a day-off 
means relinquishing control of them, giving them opportunities to have a 
private life or date—an activity that is forbidden in a conservative society 
like the UAE.”32
In addition to the long hours, about thirty percent of the workers also 
complained to the interviewer of verbal or physical abuse. Both male and 
female servants are vulnerable to harsh, derogatory criticism. Those servants 
recently surveyed in the United Arab Emirates, for example, say the following:
• “We are treated like strangers; we are not allowed to sit on the furniture 
…. I talk to other Filipinas I see in the park, they say the same thing.
• Even after working for them for eight years, I still feel I am a maid, a 
stranger. When they talk about us they say words like: stupid, know 
nothings, or maid. We are always inferior in their place.
• They order us in a way that hurts. They don’t sympathize with us. We 
are vulnerable in their houses, because we are poor.”33
The problem of physical and sexual abuse is particularly explosive. Almost 
every month, a story seeps into the press that seems to suggest that female 
servants often suffer from sexual harassment or worse. It is important to 
note that while some of the abuse does come from male relatives within the 
household, other male servants can also attempt to take advantage of female 
household workers.34
All of these issues—long hours, lack of free time, verbal and physical 
abuse—are linked to the lack of mobility that workers experience. All reports 
indicate that nearly all of the household employers hold the workers’ passport. 
It is nearly impossible, thus, for the servant to leave the household on her own 
without breaking national law. In the worst cases, servants do flee and get 
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deported back to their home country. Because, however, these workers like 
most other expatriate workers contract significant debt, it is especially difficult 
for newly arrived workers to attempt to change a hostile work environment.
One other finding that is striking is that despite all the severe problems 
outlined in this section, many servants report an interest to extend their stay 
beyond their initial visa. It is clear that domestic servitude in the Gulf has 
become a career choice for many. The Kuwaiti data also reveal that domestic 
servants have an unusually high savings rate of 86% and remit a high proportion 
of their salary (64%). Perhaps the lack of mobility and the fact that room and 
board are provided by employers, allows such servants both to accumulate 
money capital and to finance the building and improvements of houses in their 
home country. In any event, more than half the informants in Kuwait plan to 
stay three years or more; more than a third plan on returning after their initial 
visa expires; and very few reject the option of returning.35 The grim report of 
working conditions outlined in this section are just as devastating a critique of 
living and working conditions in the home countries as in the Gulf itself.
9 . concluSion
It is difficult to predict the future contours of the Gulf Arab-South Asia 
relationship. One can say, however, that the small rich Gulf States such as the 
UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar will rely on foreign labor into the indefinite future. The 
only question is from where the labor will come.
One scenario would be that the slow unification of the GCC combined with 
the relative decline of large-scale construction projects would eventually create 
a single Arabian labor market. This would allow workers and their families 
from poorer Saudi Arabia and Oman to immigrate to the richer states of the 
peninsula. Such a movement could be supplemented by a rise in females in the 
labor force and a return to the large-scale utilization of Yemeni labor in earlier 
times. Expatriate labor from outside Arabia would not be eliminated, but the 
relative importance of the South Asian workforce would decline.
Despite the possibility of such a scenario, great cultural and political 
barriers will probably block such developments. The experience of the first 
Gulf War suggests that rulers will avoid the political challenges to authority that 
the presence of low-wage Arab workers might pose. Moreover, ideologically 
based cultural resistance to a pronounced expansion of female labor into the 
clerical and retail sectors remains particularly strong in the largest country of 
the Arabian Peninsula—Saudi Arabia.36 Finally, the unification of labor markets 
might lead to pressures to unify social and welfare policy. It is highly unlikely, 
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however, that the richer energy states will share their bounty with poorer, non-
citizen Arabic speaking brethren. 
Southeast Asia could be an alternative source of labor, rather than 
South Asia. Filipino labor already figures importantly in the retail and leisure 
service sectors of the UAE economy. In addition, Muslim Indonesia might be 
an obvious source for the male labor requisite for future large construction 
projects. On the other hand, if infrastructural construction projects decline, 
there would not be probably a significant shift in the origins of workers. Rather, 
it is more likely that the recruitment of clerical and service workers into large 
and small enterprises would use pre-existing channels. The large presence of 
a settled South Asian business and professional population and the ability of 
workers to sell the documents for entry into the Gulf labor markets facilitate 
the recruitment of workers of similar nationality. 
Nearly all micro-oriented studies of immigration emphasize that movements 
of people take place through dense, regionally concentrated social networks. 
It would take a significant political shift such as that catalyzed by the Gulf 
War for the directions of labor flows to change significantly. If, as we have 
argued, regional integration and the feminization of the labor force through 
the utilization of national women are not likely to fully develop, then significant 
shifts in the regional flows of people are not likely.
For this reason, the more likely scenario is for a continuation and even 
deepening of the Asian/Gulf labor flow relationship. As GDP per capita grows 
within the Gulf region, the demands for service and professional workers will 
increase. Short of a major disruption in the political economic framework of the 
Arabian Sea economy, labor and financial flows between South Asia and the 
Gulf states in general and Kerala and the UAE in particular should continue. The 
ambivalent anxieties unleashed by the intensive utilization of South Asian labor 
in the Gulf are a permanent political economic product of the labor networks, 
remittances and capital flows emanating from a still emerging Arabian Sea 
economy. 
Workers decide whether or not to immigrate to the Gulf by comparing the 
income they expect to receive over the contract period with their opportunities 
in the home country. A higher expected income will induce more workers to 
leave their home country. Because South Asia has a large pool of surplus labor, 
this graph depicts a relatively horizontal or elastic supply curve. Demand is 
regulated by the employers’ calculation of wage costs over the life of the contract 
in comparison to the workers’ projected economic productivity. If custom or law 
sets expected income (or wage costs) at Y*, then this disequilibrium income 
level will generate a permanent labor surplus. Unemployed immigrant workers 
in the Gulf and workers in South Asia waiting for entry after having paid the 
necessary “entry” fees constitute this surplus, which on the graph is equal to 
the line segment between Z* and Z.
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appendix . the extraction of rentS from immigrant workerS
The graph also indicates that many workers will be willing to pay the 
difference between the income they need to induce them to immigrate to the 
Gulf and the income they expect to receive. Most of these payments to agents 
and sponsors represent rent (or employee surplus) that the workers would 
have received but have instead transferred to these intermediaries. A portion 
of the payment may be for actual job finding services provided by the agent. 
Economists would not classify this payment as a rental payment. Unemployed 
workers who make these rental payments have clearly been cheated. It is 
possible as well that employed immigrants have been cheated because they 
employed agents that did not fulfill their obligations or misrepresented their 
employment prospects.
John willoughBy
55
referenceS
Addleton, J.S. (1992): Undermining the Centre: The Gulf Migration and Pakistan, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Chammartin, G.M.F. (2004): “Women Migrant Workers’ Protection in Arab 
League States”, in Esim, S. and Smith, M. (eds.): Gender and Migration 
in Arab States: The Case of Domestic Workers, ILO, Regional Office for 
Arab States, Beirut.
Dreze, J. and Amartya, S. (1995): India: Economic Development and Social 
Opportunity, Oxford University Press, Delhi.
Doumato, E.A. (1999): “Women and Work in Saudi Arabia: How Flexible Are 
Islamic Margins?”, The Middle East Journal, 53, Autumn, 568-83.
El Musa, S.S. (1997): “Technology and the Dynamics of Socio-Economic 
Change”, The Middle East Journal, 51, Summer, 358-72.
Gulati, I.S. and Ashoka, M. (1983): “Remittances of Indian Migrants to the 
Middle East: An Assessment with Special Reference to Migrants from 
Kerala State”, Working Paper 182, Trivandrum Centre for Development 
Studies.
Gulati, L. (1993): In the Absence of Their Men: The Impact of Male Migration 
on Women, Sage Publications, New Delhi.
Gulf News, Dubai. Various Editions.
International Monetary Fund (1998): “United Arab Emirates: Recent Economic 
Developments”, Staff Country Report 98/134, Washington, DC.
Kapiszewski, A. (2000): “Population, Labor and Education Dilemmas Facing 
GCC States at the Turn of the Century”, paper presented at the conference 
Crossroads of the New Millenium, Abu Dhabi, UAE, April 9.
Lewis, W.A. (1954): “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of 
Labour”, The Manchester School, 232, 139-91.
Longva, A.N. (1997): Walls Built on Sand: Migration and Exclusion in Kuwait, 
Westview Press, Boulder.
Nair, P.R.G. (1998): “The Process of Migration”, in Prakash, B.A. (ed.): Indian 
Migration to the Middle East: Trends, Patterns and Socio-Economic 
Impacts, Spellbound Publications, Rohtak.
Prakash, B.A. (1998): “Gulf Migration and Its Economic Impact: The Kerala 
Experience”, Economic and Political Weekly, 12 December, 3210.
Russell, S.S. and Muhammad A.A-R. (1994): “Kuwait’s Migration Policy 
since the Gulf Crisis”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 26, 
November, 569-87.
Sabban, R. (2004): “Women Migrant Domestic Workers in the United Arab 
Emirates”, in Esim, S. and Smith, M. (eds.): Gender and Migration in Arab 
States: The Case of Domestic Workers, ILO, Regional Office for Arab 
States, Beirut.
amBivalent anxietieS of the South aSian-gulf araB laBor exchange
reviSta de economía mundial 14, 2006, 31-56
56
Sherry, V. (2004): “Bad Dreams: Exploitation and Abuse of Migrant Workers in 
Saudi Arabia”, Human Rights Watch Index No. E1605, July.
Tharamangalam, J. (1998): “The Perils of Social Development with Economic 
Growth: The Development Debacle of Kerala, India”, Bulletin of Concerned 
Asian Scholars, January-March.
Todaro, M.P. (1976): Internal Migration in Developing Countries Internacvional, 
Labor Office, Geneva.
United Nations Development Program (2001): Human Development Report 
2001, Oxford University Press, New York.
Willoughby, J. (2005): “A Quiet Revolution in the Making? The Replacement 
of Expatriate Labor through the Feminization of the Labor Force in GCC 
Countries”, Working Paper, American University, March.
Zachariah, K.C., Mathew, E.T. and Irudaya Rajan, S. (2000): “Dynamics of 
Migration in Kerala: Dimensions, Differentials and Consequences”, 
Thirunananthapuram Centre for Development Studies, Indo-Dutch 
Program on Alternatives in Development, October.
Zachariah, K.C., Mathew, E.T. and Irudaya Rajan, S. (1999): “Migration in Kerala 
State, India: Dimensions, Determinants and Consequences”, Working 
Paper I, Thiruvananthapuram Centre for Development Studies.
Zachariah, K.C., Mathew, E.T. and Irudaya Rajan, S. (2000): “Migration in Kerala 
State, India: Dimensions, Determinants and Consequences”, Working 
Paper II, Thirunananthapuram Centre for Development Studies, May.
Zachariah, K.C., Mathew, E.T. and Irudaya Rajan, S. (2001): “Impact of Migration 
on Kerala’s Economy and Society”, International Migration, 39, 66.
John willoughBy
